Abstract The desirability of an outcome often depends on the action that must be taken to bring it about. Using a within-subject design that permits the identification of individual preferences, I report experimental evidence from disinterested dictator games suggesting that preferences over income distributions depend on whether implementing those distributions requires the allocation of gains, the imposition of losses or the redistribution of pre-existing endowments. Subjects exhibit a stronger preference for equality when the action required to implement it involves the unequal allocation of income or redistribution of wealth than when it requires the unequal imposition of losses, an effect that increases in the amount of initial inequality. The evidence is inconsistent with any model of preferences defined solely over outcomes, but can be explained by existing models of narrow choice bracketing.
this information into the descriptions of the states of the world over which an individual's preferences are defined.
2 This paper reports evidence that helps motivate and inform that project in the context of preferences over allocations of income and wealth and highlights an important way in which traditional models of distributional preferences may be incomplete. I find that subjects are significantly less willing to remedy randomly generated income inequalities when doing so would require the asymmetric imposition of losses than when doing so would require the asymmetric allocation of gains or the redistribution of income from one person to another.
A corollary of the fact that people have preferences over actions is that differences in initial conditions, which typically imply differences in the kind of action required to implement a given outcome, will influence the likelihood that an outcome is achieved. While the general importance of the status quo is now widely accepted, little is known about the specific relationship between initial conditions and preferences over final outcomes more generally, particularly when circumstances require a departure from the status quo. Thus, while there is a vast experimental literature exploring distributional preferences and an important and growing number of studies identifying the ways in which preferences are context-dependent, 3 most studies examine the preferences of people making allocation decisions in a near-vacuum and rationalize those decisions using preference models defined solely over the final wealth levels of individuals, an approach that obscures any possible effect of initial conditions.
Yet, most real-world policy decisions that involve the distribution of economic benefits and burdens, such as how progressive the income tax should be or how and to whom government expenditures should be made, are not made on a blank slate, but against a backdrop of pre-existing inequalities. Understanding how revealed preferences over distributional outcomes are contingent on such pre-existing inequalities and the actions required to remedy them will help improve the external validity of many of these experimental results. While one might think that all that should matter when evaluating alternative courses of action are the states of the world that will result from them, the following anecdote from McCaffery and Baron (2003) (hereafter "MB") helps to provide intuition for why a person may care about the effects of her own actions, in addition to the overall consequences:
Imagine a divorced couple with equal assets. The first to die leaves her estate all to the older child. The survivor favors equality rather than primogeniture. He can now aggregate the outcomes and leave his estate all to the younger child, or he can simply apply his principle to his own decision.
MB refer to the tendency to give independent weight to the effects of one's own actions, rather than to fully integrate those effects with the background circumstances and consider only overall outcomes, a "disaggregation bias" that they observe in a sample of subjects responding to a survey on income taxation. When asked to select the fair marginal tax rates for a set of income brackets, respondents tend to choose a similar rate structure both when their decision is made in the presence of an existing (flat) payroll tax and not. As a consequence, the subjects express different preferences over aggregate tax burdens in the two conditions.
It is noteworthy that MB observe this effect in a context without any uncertainty; similar effects are often identified in the "choice bracketing" literature where it is suggested that the tendency to focus narrowly on the effects of a single decision results from a failure to appreciate diversification benefits when evaluating gambles. The MB study suggests that choice bracketing may not be limited to risky choices. However, while suggestive, the study is directed at a very specific question and its generality has not been tested. Notwithstanding the relative simplicity of their survey, the contextual detail provided to subjects about payroll and income taxes may have caused them to be perceived as nonfungible. It is also difficult to rule out the explanation that disaggregation bias results from individuals' inability to calculate the effect of their decision in conjunction with other factors, rather than because they really do care about the effects of their own decision.
If individuals have preferences over their actions, as well as the states of the world that they lead to, then this ought to be apparent in a simple and controlled setting involving decisions over real stakes that abstract from the complications that arise from asking subjects about taxation. The experimental results reported here address these concerns and provide evidence that disaggregation bias reflects actual preferences and go further to describe how the desirability of outcomes depends on the the actions required to implement them and, consequently, how pre-existing inequalities affect distributional preferences. The design of the experiment can be easily understood by considering the following three scenarios:
1. A and B have $30 and $70, respectively. You may take up to $30 from either subject and give it to the other. 2. A and B have $0 and $40, respectively. You have an additional $60 which must be allocated between them in any manner you choose. 3. A and B have $60 and $100, respectively. You must collect a total of $60 from the two of them in any manner you choose.
The set of feasible outcomes in the three scenarios is identical. What differs is the action required to implement any given allocation. In order to implement an equal allocation of wealth, the first scenario requires taking from B in order to give to A; the second scenario requires giving disproportionately to A; and the third scenario requires taking disproportionately from B. If subjects care only about the final allocation of income between A and B then they should implement the same payoffs in all three scenarios described above. If the subjects care also about the effect of their own actions, then they may not.
Conceptualized in the familiar two good commodity space, the research question is whether a person's preferences are defined over vectors as well as points, and so the following notation may be helpful in describing the experiment. The dictator observes a random allocation of initial endowments to Subjects 1 and 2, given by the point ω = (ω 1 , ω 2 ), and then chooses an allocation action, given by the vector a = (a 1 , a 2 ). The sum of the two results in final payoffs given by the point π = (π 1 , π 2 ). A general utility specification for a decision-maker that cares both about the final distribution of payoffs between 1 and 2 and the independent effect of her own action is given below, and resembles the outcome-based model with narrow bracketing proposed by Huang (2009) and Barberis et.al. (2006) and applied in Rabin and Weizsäcker (2009) :
The decision-maker chooses a to maximize U . u(·) represents the decision-maker's intrinsic and relative concern for the overall welfare of Subjects 1 and 2 and is defined over their final payoffs. m(·) is defined over the actions available to the dictator, thereby giving independent weight to the effect of the decision-maker's action. Charness and Rabin (2002) provide a flexible specification of social preferences that could be used for either u or m. The parameter λ ∈ [0, 1] determines the relative weight a decisionmaker places on final outcomes as compared with the effects of her own action. Traditional outcome-based models of preferences assume that λ = 1.
Section 2 locates this experiment in the context of the related literature and explains the novelty of these findings. Section 3 describes the design and procedures of the experiment. Section 4 summarizes and analyzes the key results. Section 5 concludes by discussing the implications of the results and avenues of further research.
Related Literature
There is a growing empirical literature related to the "narrow bracketing" of decisions made under uncertainty, including Weizsäcker (2009), Thaler et.al. (1997) , Gneezy and Potters (1997), Battalio et.al. (1990) , Camerer (1989) , and Tversky and Kahneman (1981) . These studies document a tendency on the part of people to evaluate the consequences of risky gambles in isolation from the other risks that they face, including even risks that they undertake at the same time. Barberis and Huang (2009) provide a tractable preference framework that reflects a direct concern for the outcomes of individual gambles, in addition to the indirect contribution that such gambles make to the wealth of the individual. This model generates predictions broadly consistent with the empirical evidence.
Although several reasons have been offered for why people narrowly bracket risky decisions, none of them are limited to decision-making under uncertainty or suggest that we should only expect this behavior in that context. First, it may be that people don't think carefully about the effects of their decisions. Second, it may be that people utilize a heuristic to ignore irrelevant information that causes them to occasionally ignore information that is relevant to their decision. Third, narrow bracketing may not a product of cognitive bias at all, but reflect the fact a person actually has preferences over their own actions, as well as the outcomes they lead to; it may be that people care about their own contribution to an outcome as well as the outcome itself. 4 It is hard to refute the conjecture that some sort of cognitive error, rather than the structure of actual preferences, is the cause of choice bracketing; however, one way to try and disentangle these hypotheses is through the use of experiments involving decisions with real monetary payoffs in a simplified setting that makes optimizing as easy as possible. The dictator game provides such a setting.
There is some evidence that even in this highly simplified context the distribution of final payoffs is sensitive to initial endowments. For example, Eichenberger and Oberholzer-Gee (1998) show that the likelihood of implementing a given set of payoffs is affected by whether the dictator is tasked with giving some of her endowment to her partner or taking some of her partner's endowment for herself. However, this study (and other unpublished studies) uses a between-subject design in which the dictator could only redistribute an endowment that was given entirely to her partner or herself. By contrast, this study uses a within-subject design in which each dictator made sixty different decisions that varied both in the dictator's share of initial endowments and the kind of action required to achieve a given outcome, namely: (1) allocating additional income, (2) 'taxing' subjects by imposing losses, and (3) redistributing previously allocated income. The result is a rich data set that allows me to explore and map individual preferences over a larger and more diverse set of action vectors.
Experimental Design and Procedures

Design
The experiment involved a series of simple variations on the three-person disinterested dictator game designed to test if and how subjects' preferences over income distributions depend on the actions required to implement them. The 3x10x2 design included three manipulations: the kind of action required to achieve an outcome from a budget set, the location of the budget set and the size of the budget set.
Each subject in the experiment participated in six treatments: two Gain treatments (G60 and G30), two Loss treatments (L60 and L30), and two Redistribution treatments (R60 and R30). Each treatment had ten rounds and the order of the treatments was randomized by subject. Every round proceeded in an identical manner. At the beginning of a round each subject, in her role as dictator, was randomly matched with two other subjects identified to the dictator only as Subjects 1 and 2. A number of tokens was then randomly allocated between those two subjects and the dictator was then required to take an action that would determine those subjects' final payoffs from that round. The dictator did not receive any payoffs from her own decisions.
In the G60(G30) treatment, the initial allocation of tokens summed to 40(70), and the dictator was required to allocate 60(30) additional tokens between her two partners. In the L60(L30) treatment, 160(130) tokens were randomly allocated to Subjects 1 and 2 and the dictator was required to take and discard 60(30) tokens from the two of them. In the Redistribution treatment, 100 tokens were randomly allocated to the dictators' partners and the dictator was permitted to take up to 30(15) tokens from one and give them to the other. So, each treatment label identifies the kind of action required of the dictator and the size of the budget set. Each token was worth $0.25.
In order to isolate the effect of the character of the action (i.e., allocating gains, losses, or redistributing income) on distributional preferences, it is essential to hold the shape of the budget set constant. List (2007) , Bardsley (2007) , and Falk et.al. (2003) provide evidence that changes in a decisionmaker's choice set, including the introduction of even unselected alternatives, can affect a decision-maker's revealed preferences over the allocations within that set. So, in order to separately test the effect of action type and variations in the budget set on preferences over outcomes, each round in the G60 treatment had counterparts in the L60 and R60 treatments so that the decisions made in those three treatments were from the same budget sets. For example, a dictator faced with initial endowments of (10,30) in a G60 decision would also encounter endowments of (40,60) in a R60 decision and (70,90) in a L60 decision. Figure 1 provides a graphical illustration of this example. In the same way, decisions in the G30 treatment had counterparts in the L30 and R30 treatments. Thus, each subject made a Gain, Loss and Redistribution decision for each of twenty different budget sets, making it possible to examine both the average effect of the action type (giving, taking or redistributing) on final payoffs, as well as how this effect might vary with the size and location of the budget set. In each round, while making her own dictator decision, each dictator was also one of the recipient subjects (i.e., "Subject 1" or "Subject 2") for two other dictators and her payoff in that round was determined by those other two dictators' decisions. These were not the subjects with whom she was partnered for her own decision. Subjects did not observe the tokens they were given by these dictators or the initial endowments from which those dictators' decision were made. One round was chosen at random to be paid out at the end of the experiment, and subjects were shown the payoffs from the two decisions that determined their payoffs. Because all features of the other subjects' decisions were hidden, the expected number of tokens that any one subject would receive from other dictators was identical in every round, and so a dictator's expectations of how other dictators would behave cannot explain a pattern of choices in which payoffs correlate with initial endowments or action types.
An important feature of the design was the simplicity of the decisions made by the subjects and the relative ease with which they should have been able to determine the action that would have been required to implement a given outcome. A sample decision screen is provided in Figure 2 . Dictators were shown their partners' endowments and asked to add, subtract, or permitted to redistribute a fixed number of tokens. A calculator was available on each decision screen to make it even easier for dictators to determine what action to take in order to implement their most preferred outcome.
Procedures
The experiment was conducted over four sessions at the Experimental Social Science Laboratory at U.C. Berkeley (the "X-Lab"). Subjects were recruited by the X-Lab administrators using the X-Lab's normal recruiting procedures and were not selected for possessing any particular characteristics. At the beginning of each session, approximately 25 subjects were let into the laboratory to take their places behind laptop computers. The computers were arranged on tables in rows and separated by partitions so subjects could not see the decisions that those around them were making. After the subjects' names were collected, for the purpose of making payments at the end of the experiment, the experimenter proceeded to the center of the room where he read the instructions for the experiment. A copy of the instructions was provided to each subject next to their laptop. 5 After subjects were given the opportunity to ask clarifying questions, the experiment was initiated from the server to which each of the laptops was connected.
Subjects proceeded through each of the six treatments. After a subject finished all ten decisions in a treatment she was directed to a waiting screen, which did not change until the other subjects had made all of the decisions in their treatment. Once all subjects had finished their treatment, the subjects simultaneously moved on to the next treatment. Subjects were required to enter numbers in the response boxes on each decision screen. If they did not want to redistribute anything in the redistribution treatment, they entered '0' in these boxes.
After proceeding through all of the treatments, the subjects were presented with two survey questions. The first question asked subjects to provide what they believed to be fair marginal income tax rates for five different income brackets. The second question asked subjects to provide what they believed to be fair marginal income tax rates for the same income brackets in the presence of a pre-existing (flat) payroll tax. Income tax rates could be negative. The two questions presented economically equivalent decision problems in the sense that the set of feasible aggregate tax rates that could be imposed on each bracket were identical. The questions closely resemble those in MB and were chosen to test the robustness of their results and to provide some evidence about the relationship between the presence of disaggregation bias in survey questions and in decision tasks in this experiment. After the subjects had finished both of the survey questions they were directed to a screen that showed them the decisions that were chosen to be paid out and the payoffs that they, and the other subjects with whom they were paired, would receive from those decisions. 
Data description and analysis preliminaries
Each of the 99 subjects made sixty decisions involving an initial endowment allocation between the dictator's partners, identified to the dictator only as Subjects "1" and "2." The labels were chosen arbitrarily and conveyed no information about the identities of the subjects associated with those labels. As a result, the labels should not have affected the dictators' preferences for distribution, redistribution, or allocations of loss and the action and outcome associated with initial endowments of (x, y) should be symmetric with the action and outcome associated with initial endowments (y, x). For this reason, the data were re-labeled and analyzed as if Subject 1 received no more than half of the initial endowment in all decisions, i.e., for all decisions in which Subject 1 received more than half of the initial endowment, the endowments, actions and payoffs given by the points or vectors (x, y) are transposed in the data so that they are (y, x). To avoid confusion, I refer to the subject receiving less than 1/2 of the intial endowment as the "Underdog" for the remainder of the paper.
Experiment Results
Aggregate effects
60-Token Budget Sets
A comparison of Underdog payoffs across the L60/G60/R60 treatments indicates that the nature of the action required to implement an outcome affects the likelihood of that outcome. Because the budget sets used in the three treatments were identical and each subject participated in all three treatments, the difference in average Underdog payoffs is attributable solely to the kind of action required to achieve final payoffs. Table 1 shows, by treatment, (i) the percentage of decisions in which the dictator implemented equal final payoffs ("payoff equality"), (ii) the percentage of decisions in which the dictator's action affected her partners symmetrically by either allocating gains or losses equally or not redistributing any income ("action equality"), and (iii) the mean Underdog payoff. There are 990 observations for each treatment. Examining the first two outcomes of interest, dictators were least likely to implement equal final payoffs, and most likely to take an action that affected their partners symmetrically, in the Loss treatment. On the other hand, dictators were most likely to implement equal payoffs, and least likely to take actions that treated subjects symmetrically, in the Redistribution treatment. The difference in the proportion of decisions in the Loss and Redistribution treatments resulting in payoff equality is significant at the < 1% level and the difference in the proportion of decisions involving action equality is significant at the 10% level. The results in the Gain treatment fall in between the Loss and Redistribution treatments for both of these outcomes and only the difference in decisions resulting in payoff equality compared with the Redistribution treatment is significant at conventional levels.
As a result of dictators' disinclination to impose unequal losses in order to remedy inequality, the average Underdog payoff was lower in that treatment than in any other. The difference between the mean Underdog payoff in the Loss treatment and the mean Underdog payoff in both the Gain and Redistribution treatments was statistically significant at a 5% level. The mean Underdog payoff in the Gain treatment is greater than the mean payoff in the Redistribution treatment, but the difference is not statistically significant at conventional levels. So, for 60 token budget sets dictators were less likely to remedy pre-existing income inequality when doing so required the asymmetric imposition of losses than when it required the unequal allocation of additional income or the redistribution of income from one subject to another. There is some evidence that dictators prefer to remedy inequality through asymmetric allocations of additional income rather than redistribution, but the observed effect is not statistically significant.
30-Token Budget Sets
As noted above, there is evidence that the size and shape of the budget set can affect a person's preferences over the elements of that set, even through the introduction or removal of unselected alternatives. To explore these effects on subjects' preferences over actions, I tested for action-type effects in smaller, 30 token budget sets. Due to a coding error, the choices made by subjects in the R30 treatment were from different budget sets than those made in the L30 and G30 treatments and cannot easily be used to make inferences about the effect of redistributive acts in this setting. I therefore report results from only the L30 and G30 treatments for the 30 token budget sets. Because of the size of these budget sets, an equal split of final payoffs was not always feasible. Table 2 shows the aggregate outcomes for subjects choosing from these smaller budget sets. The difference in mean Underdog payoffs and the proportion of decisions resulting in payoff or action equality across the gain and loss treatments was not statistically significant.
While we cannot infer from these results that there is no effect of action type on distributional preferences in smaller budget sets, they are suggestive that such effects may not be constant across budget sets of different sizes and that further research into the effects of varying budget sets could be important in understanding the circumstances in which such effects are likely to be present. It is also important to note that the size of the budget set was not the only difference between the G30 and L30 treatments and the 60 Table 2 : Payoff Equality, Action Equality and Mean Underdog Payoff for 30 Token Budget Sets token treatments. Initial endowments were closer to the set of final payoffs in G30/L30 treatments and so the dictator was responsible for allocating or deducting only half as many tokens as in the G60/L60/R60 treatments. An interesting alternative explanation for the inability to identify action type effects in these smaller budget sets is that individuals' preferences over actions may also take into account some measure of the magnitude of those actions, i.e., the norm of the action vector a as well as its slope. In this case, subjects may feel differently about the asymmetric allocation of large losses than about small losses.
Heterogeneity in Action-Type Effects
The effect of action type on Underdog payoffs can be identified for each budget set from which decisions were made, permitting an exploration of the heterogeneity behind the estimate of the average. For the 60-token budget sets, mean Underdog payoffs were greater in the Gain than the Loss treatment in 19 of the 21 budget sets. This difference in payoffs declined, however, as initial endowments were closer to equality. An OLS regression of the difference in Underdog payoffs in the G60 and L60 treatments against the budget set, with subject fixed effects and errors clustered at the subject level, indicates that a one token increase in the Underdog's endowment is associated with a 0.13 token reduction in this difference. A similar regression for the effect of the budget set on the difference in final payoffs across the R60 and L60 treatments find that a one token increase in the Underdog's endowment reduces this difference by 0.19 tokens. Both effects are significant at the < 5% level. Mean Underdog payoffs were greater in the G60 than the R60 treatment in 12 of the 21 budget sets and the difference did not exhibit a statistically significant relationship with the budget set. For the 30-token budget sets, mean Underdog payoffs were greater in the Gain than the Loss treatment in exactly half of the 36 budget sets and there is not statistically significant relationship between this difference and the budget set, controlling for individual fixed effects and clustering errors at the subject level. Thus, it appears that the effect of having to impose asymmetric losses, rather than allocate asymmetric gains or redistribute, in order to remedy inequality increases with the amount of that initial inequality.
Consistent with other studies such as List (2007) , the data also indicate that changes in initial endowments affect final payoffs even where, as in the G60/L60/R60 treatments, the dictator was able to implement equal final payoffs in all decisions. However, the effect of initial endowments on final payoffs is not constant across the treatments for larger budget sets. Final payoffs are much more closely correlated with initial endowments when the dictator is required to make asymmetric loss allocations in the L60 treatment to remedy pre-existing inequality but this effect is not statistically significant for the smaller budget sets. Table 3 provides regression estimates of the effect of the action type and the budget set on the final payoffs of the Underdog. The regression contains pooled estimates with dictator fixed effects and errors clustered at the dictator level. For the 60-token budget sets, the average Underdog payoff was nearly 7 tokens less when the dictator needed to impose asymmetric losses in order to remedy the endowment inequality than when the dictator needed to allocate gains asymmetrically, an effect that is significant at a < 1% level. In addition, the effect of initial endowments on final payoffs is stronger in the Loss than the Gain treatment, an effect that is significant at the 5% level.
The relationship between final payoffs and initial endowments is also statistically significant for the 30-token budget sets, but is more difficult to interpret because these budget sets did not all include a 50/50 split as a feasible allocation. The relationship could result from subject preferences for payoff equality and a binding budget constraint. In the case of the 60-token budget sets, however, this cannot be the explanation because equal payoffs were always feasible. 
Individual-level Analysis for 60-Token Budget Sets
In the aggregate, subjects choosing from larger budget sets were significantly less likely to implement equal outcomes when doing so required the asymmetric allocation of losses than when it required redistribution or the asymmetric allocation of gains. And, subjects were more likely to impose losses equally than they were to allocate gains equally or to avoid redistribution. Given this behavior, it is unsurprising that randomly generated inequality showed greater persistence in the Loss than in the Gain or Redistribution treatments, an effect that increases in the amount of that initial inequality. Because repeated observations were collected from each subject, the composition of these effects can be examined by looking at the behavior of individual subjects.
Recalling the aggregate outcomes summarized in Table 1, Table 4 shows the percentage of dictators for whom the mean Underdog payoff, and the frequency of implementing payoff equality and action equality, varied by treatment. For example, 35% of dictators made more decisions implementing equal payoffs in the R60 treatment than in the L60 treatment. The percentage of subjects exhibiting the opposite behavior is provided in parentheses. Thus, the percentage of dictators that provided higher payoffs for the Underdog in the L60 treatment than in the G60 treatment is 23%. The numbers in Table 4 indicate that the aggregate effects described in the previous section are attributable to preference heterogeneity and a greater number of subjects exhibiting the behavior consistent with those aggregate patterns, rather than the effects of a few extreme decisions or subjects. For example, more subjects were more likely to implement payoff equality in the Redistribution treatment than in the Gain treatment and in the Gain treatment than in the Loss treatment. This is consistent with the aggregate frequency of decisions implementing payoff equality in those three treatments as described in Table 1 . Similarly, more subjects implemented higher Underdog payoffs in the Gain treatment than in the Redistribution treatment and in the Redistribution treatment than in the Loss treatment, which is also consistent with the mean Underdog payoffs in the three treatments.
Payoff Equality Action Equality Mean Underdog Payoff
Furthermore, although dictators only made 10 decisions in each treatment, the differences in mean Underdog payoffs across treatments are statistically significant for a number of these subjects. Two-tailed t-tests of differences in mean Underdog payoffs indicate that, at the 10% significance level, 18 dictators implemented different payoffs in the Gain than the Loss treatment, 16 dictators implemented different payoffs in the Gains than the Redistribution treatment, and 13 implemented different payoffs in the Loss than the Redistribution treatment. In total, the difference in Underdog payoffs across at least two treatments was statistically significant for 28 different subjects. Under the alternative hypothesis that individual dictators' behavior is consistent with the aggregate pattern, i.e., that they are more likely to remedy inequality in the Gain treatment than the Redistribution treatment and in the Redistribution treatment than in the Loss treatment, 24 dictators implemented payoffs that were closer to equality in the Gain than the Loss treatment, 15 implemented payoffs that were closer to equality in the Gain than the Redistribution treatment, and 14 implemented payoffs that were closer to equality in the Redistribution than in the Loss treatment. MB found that when people were asked to state what they believed to be "fair" marginal income tax rates for several different income brackets, they tended to respond with similar rates regardless of whether that income was already subject to a flat tax that would be imposed in addition to the income tax or that there was no tax other than the income tax and that the rates they chose would be the sole determinant of the aggregate tax burden. If individuals cared only about the overall distribution of after-tax income, they should have adjusted their ideal income tax rates to compensate for the flat tax. Since they did not, overall average tax rates were higher, and exhibited less progressivity, in the presence of a flat tax than when none was present. The possibility that this result is indicative of a general tendency to "narrowly bracket" choices was part of the motivation for this study.
At the end of this experiment, subjects were presented with two survey questions nearly identical to those asked in MB. Subjects were asked to provide what they thought the fair marginal tax rates were for each of five income brackets (the "No Tax" condition). The survey screen is reproduced in Figure 4 . They were then asked to assume that all income was already subject to a flat payroll tax of 5% and then to provide the marginal income tax rates that were fair for those same five brackets (the "Flat Tax" condition). Income tax rates could be negative. Like MB, I find that subjects did not fully adjust their preferred marginal income tax rates to compensate for the pre-existing flat tax. Comparing the aggregate tax schedule implemented by survey respondents (schedules given by the income tax rates in the No Tax condition and by the sum of the income tax rates and 5% in the Flat Tax condition), 89% of subjects implemented a more progressive schedule in the No Tax condition than in the Flat Tax condition and only 10% chose equally progressive schedules.
8 72% of subjects implemented a higher average tax rate in the Flat Tax condition than in the No Tax condition and 21% implemented identical average tax rates. The difference in average tax rates and average progressivity in tax rates across the two treatments is significant at the <1% level. Summary statistics are provided in Table 5 .
There is little evidence, however, that disaggregation bias as revealed in the surveys is related to narrow bracketing in the experiment. The 28 subjects, noted in Section 4.2, that exhibited statistically significant differences in the payoffs they allocated to the Underdog between at least two of the treatments had a mean difference in average tax rates of 1.91 percentage points and a mean difference in the slope of tax rates of 0.23. On the other hand, those subjects who did not exhibit statistically significant differences in how they behaved across treatments had a mean difference in tax rates of 1.76 and a mean difference in slopes of Table 5 : Average Tax Rate and Progressivity of Rate Schedule 0.38. The differences across the two groups of subjects is not statistically significant at conventional levels and so the results are inconclusive.
Summary and Discussion
People care about the effects of their own actions, and not just the states of the world that result from them after taking into account initial conditions, luck and the actions of other people. While there is a growing body of evidence demonstrating the pervasiveness of narrowly bracketing decisions made under uncertainty, none of the purported explanations imply that the phenomenon should only occur in the context of risky gambles. Yet, the narrow bracketing of decisions in other contexts has not been much explored. Since most outcomes require actions to bring them about, this is an important area of research.
In this paper, I report evidence that the action required to implement a particular distribution of wealth across individuals affects the desirability of that distribution. Individuals are more willing to remedy preexisting inequality through the asymmetric allocation of additional income than through redistribution of endowments, and they are least willing to remedy that inequality when doing so would require the asymmetric imposition of losses. As a consequence, initial endowments, which are correlated with subjects' final payoffs across all three kinds of decisions, are most closely correlated in the Loss treatment. The greater persistence of initial inequality in the Loss treatment, relative to the Gain and Redistribution treatments, increases with the amount of that inequality. The statistically significant differences in behavior across the treatments and the simplicity of the decision tasks suggest that the the observed effects are not the result of random errors or inattention, but reflects underlying preferences. At the same time, preferences over actions appear to be sensitive to their magnitude as well as their "direction." Although subjects dislike imposing unequal losses more than unequal gains or redistributing income, this effect disappears when a subject's actions have 50% "smaller" effects, i.e., actions affecting the allocation of 30 rather than 60 tokens. These results raise questions about the ways that initial conditions have been thought to affect economic decision-making and the way in which individuals care about the welfare of others.
The fact that endowments are correlated with final payoffs in both the Gain and Loss treatments indicates that the starting point for a decision exerts an influence over the final outcomes that are achieved even if that point is not itself among the set of feasible outcomes. Numerous studies purport to explain the effect of initial conditions on final outcomes as arising from either a general tendency toward inaction, a so-called "omission bias," or a preference for the status quo. However, whereas the effect of endowments on final payoffs in the Redistribution treatment could be explained by omission or status quo bias, the status quo outcome is not available in the Gain and Loss treatments and the dictator is required to take an action that changes her partners' payoffs.
I have suggested that these effects can be understood by focusing on the dictator's actions, and reframing the question of how the status quo itself affects the desirability of certain outcomes to how the status quo determines the kinds of actions that are necessary to implement those outcomes. This approach has the advantage that preferences over actions can be modeled using existing narrow-bracketing models such as those described in Section 1. The idea that people would care about their own contribution to an outcome is also consistent with the literature cited in Section 1 related to individuals' concern for the attribution of responsibility.
This research suggests that support for policies with distributive effects may depend on the manner in which they are effectuated. For example, the set of policy actions that can be used to alter the income and wealth distribution includes redistributive taxation, but also means-testing for the provision of subsidies, benefits and fees and the application of legal rules with distributional consequences. Understanding the kinds of actions and policies that people find more or less desirable as means of accomplishing a given objective will shed light on the reasons for the generally observed reluctance to deviate from the status quo and suggest ways to move past it.
Experiment Materials
INSTRUCTIONS
Thank you for participating in this experiment on decision-making. You will receive $5 for your participation, and an additional amount of money, between $0 and $40, to be paid as a result of decisions made during the experiment by other participants, and luck. Your decisions will not affect how much money you receive, but they will affect how much others receive. On average, subjects in the experiment will receive $25. You will make decisions in several different situations, but your choices are independent from each other, so that none of the choices you make will affect your other choices, or anyone else's choice, in any way. All decisions will be made on the computer in front of you using software that has been programmed for this experiment.
Please pay careful attention to the instructions; a considerable amount of money is at stake. The entire experiment should be complete within an hour and a half. At the end of the experiment you will be paid privately. Details of how you will make decisions and receive payments will be provided during the experiment. Throughout the experiment we will speak in terms of experimental tokens instead of dollars. Your payoffs from each decision will be calculated in terms of tokens and then translated at the end of the experiment into dollars at the following rate: 5 Tokens = 1 Dollar.
This experiment consists of six sections with 10 decisions each and a short questionnaire at the end. All of the decisions within a section are similar. Before beginning each section you will see an instruction screen which describes the kinds of decisions you'll be making in that section. Please read these instructions carefully. For your reference, the instructions will also appear on each decision screen, which will also tell you how many questions remain in the section. At the end of each section we'll pause until everyone has finished their section, so please take your time and think before making your decisions. An example of a typical decision screen is given below:
In this example, you have been randomly paired with two other people in the room and 40 tokens have been randomly divided between the two of them \using a random number generator. You have an additional 60 tokens to allocate between the two other subjects in any way that you would like, which you can do by entering the number of tokens you would like to allocate to each person in their box. After entering the numbers in the boxes and confirming that you have made the decision you want, you should click the "Make Allocation" button.
In each decision, the final number of tokens that the other subjects will receive is the number of tokens that were initially allocated to them, plus any change you make in the boxes. You should always be sure to enter something in the decision boxes, even if it is just "0". If you want to enter a negative number, simply put a negative sign before the number. The instructions on the screen will tell you whether you can enter positive numbers, negative numbers, or both. You can only enter whole numbers, and the computer will not accept decimals or fractions.
In the bottom right hand corner of each screen is an icon that looks like a calculator. If you would like to use the calculator for any reason, simply click on that icon.
Everyone in the room will make their decisions at the same time. Each decision you make will affect two other people. There is no way that any of your decisions can affect anybody else's decisions. The entire experiment is completely anonymous, so nobody in the experiment will know that it was you who made your decisions and no one will see the results from any of the decisions until the very end of the experiment. In each decision, the people you are paired with will also be making their own decision, but their decisions will not affect you.
The best way to think about how this works is to imagine that there is seat at a round table for every person in the experiment and that, before each decision is made, everyone pulls a number out of a hat that tells them where to sit. Each person then makes a decision that affects the two people immediately to their left. For example, suppose that there were four subjects in this experiment: A, B, C, and D. Before each of them makes a decision, they are randomly placed at the table. For instance, in the order shown below, In this example, A's decision will affect C and D. C's decision will affect D and B. D's decision will affect B and A, and B's decision will affect A and C. Every time another decision is made, C B A D the people in this room are randomly rearranged around the table. Of course in this experiment there are many more than four people, but the principle is the same.
At the end of the experiment, using a random computer number generator, we will randomly select one of the decisions made in the experiment and convert the payoffs into dollars. For instance, the random number generator might select the third decision in the fourth section. We will look at the choices that were made by everyone in the experiment for that decision and, looking at the places where everyone was "sitting at the (imaginary) table", we will assign payoffs based on those decisions. For instance, in the given example above, the number of dollars D will receive will be determined by the decisions made by C and A. All of the decisions in the experiment are equally likely to be chosen.
You and the other subjects will each make 60 decisions during the course of the experiment. There are six sections of 10 decisions each. After making all of these decisions, you will be asked to complete a short questionnaire, which will not affect the amount of money you will receive today at all. After finishing the questionnaire, you will observe the two decisions that determined your payoff for the experiment.
Please feel free to ask questions at any point if you feel you need clarification. Please do so by raising your hand. Please DO NOT attempt to communicate with any other participants in the session until the session is concluded.
We will proceed to the decisions once the instructions are clear. Are there any questions?
Ok, thank you again for your participation. We will start the experiment NOW. 
